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I. THE UNITED STATES’ INTERNATIONAL PATENT EXHAUSTION REGIME WILL 
NOT ALLOW FOR PARALLEL IMPORTS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND WILL NOT 
PREVENT UNFAIR PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
The patent exhaustion doctrine generally provides that when a patent holder 
sells or authorizes the sale of a patented product, the patent rights in that item are 
exhausted. The patent holder cannot chase the item down the stream of commerce 
to impose restrictions on its use or resale.1 One issue that arises is whether a 
domestic sale is required to trigger patent exhaustion, or if sales overseas can also 
trigger patent exhaustion. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) is agnostic on this question, providing that “nothing in 
this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual 
 
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University, San Francisco, California. Thanks to Mike Mireles and the 
participants at the conference, Changing Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: Pricing, Intellectual Property, Trade and 
Ethics, held at the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law on April 6, 2019. Thanks also to Ted 
Sichelman and the participants at the Ninth Annual Patent Law Conference, held at the University of San Diego 
School of Law on March 23, 2019. Dedicated to Dr. Kavita Vijayaraghavan Ernst, who may disagree with some 
of my ideas, but who helps more people in a single hour of work than I will ever help in my entire life. 
1.  See generally Samuel F. Ernst, Total Patent Exhaustion!, 59 IDEA 41, 43–44 (2018). 
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property rights.”2 As a result, some countries have adopted a “national exhaustion” 
regime, where only a domestic sale triggers exhaustion, but other countries have 
adopted an “international exhaustion” regime, where sales in foreign countries 
trigger exhaustion.3 The European Union (“E.U.”) opted for a regime of “regional 
exhaustion,” whereby the authorized sale of a patented product in any E.U. country 
exhausts patent rights throughout the E.U., but patent rights in the item survive to 
prevent resale outside of the E.U.4 
In 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided that U.S. 
patent law provides for national exhaustion, holding exhaustion only occurs “when 
a patented device has been lawfully sold in the United States.”5 But, in 2016, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider that issue in the case of Impression 
Products v. Lexmark.6 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (“PhRMA”) filed an amicus brief in the case urging the Court to affirm 
the Federal Circuit’s adoption of a national exhaustion regime. Among PhRMA’s 
arguments was that national exhaustion was good policy because it allowed for 
geographic price discrimination for patented pharmaceuticals: 
 
The current rule that foreign sales do not exhaust U.S. patent rights 
allows pharmaceutical manufacturers to independently price and 
distribute medicines in a socially optimal way. Differences in 
pricing can provide patients in lower-income countries access to 
important drugs, while also providing the opportunity for 
pharmaceutical companies to recoup their costs and continue 
further research and development.7 
 
PhRMA warned that adopting an international exhaustion regime would allow 
for parallel imports of patented pharmaceuticals into the United States, which 
would force pharmaceutical companies to suspend useful price discrimination for 
lower-income countries or to withdraw from those markets: 
 
Faced with the prospect of automatic foreign exhaustion—and the 
inability to assert its patent rights against entities importing drugs 
first sold in other countries for lower prices—a U.S. patent holder 
 
2.  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, Art. VI. [hereinafter “Trips Agreement”].  
3.  See SHUBHA GHOSH & IRENE CALBOLI, EXHAUSTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 88–113 
(2018). 
4.  Id. at 103. 
5.  Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001), abrogated by Impression 
Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 198 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017). 
6.  Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 546 (Dec. 2, 2016) (order granting certiorari). 
7.  Brief for Pharmaceutical Res. & Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Impression Prods. Inc., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189), 2017 WL 
894890.  
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might decide not to sell in a foreign market at all. As one academic 
has noted, citing an example of a drug product in France, 
patentholders ‘may rationally choose to abandon small markets 
that contribute minimally to global revenues rather than accept 
prices that would pull down the revenues that can be achieved in 
other, larger markets.’ A rule of automatic foreign exhaustion that 
would permit the importation and resale of U.S.-patented goods 
from overseas, free and clear of U.S. patent rights, would only 
compound pharmaceutical manufacturers’ concerns about 
entering foreign markets with stringent price controls or weak 
patent regimes that result in lower drug revenues.8 
 
Despite these warnings, the Supreme Court rejected PhRMA’s position in 
Impression Products, ruling that “a patentee’s decision to sell a product exhausts 
all of its patent rights in that item, regardless of. . . the location of the sale.”9 
And, PhRMA’s warnings proved false. Branded pharmaceutical companies 
continue to engage in geographic price discrimination, although as discussed 
below, they do not do so in a way that is “socially optimal.”10 Their ability to price 
discriminate is facilitated by the fact that even under an international exhaustion 
regime, parallel imports of pharmaceuticals without the authorization of the 
manufacturer are prohibited in the U.S. 
Pursuant to the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 (“PDMA”), only the 
original manufacturer of a prescription drug is permitted to import or re-import it 
into the United States.11 Regarding re-importation, the statute provides, “no drug 
subject to section 353(b) of this title or composed wholly or partly of insulin which 
is manufactured in a State and exported may be imported into the United States 
unless the drug is imported by the manufacturer of the drug.”12 PhRMA’s amicus 
brief in Impression Products argued that this statute did not provide 
pharmaceutical companies with adequate protection because “the text of the statute 
makes clear that it applies only to drugs manufactured in the United States, not 
those produced abroad.”13 However, the very next section of the statute prohibits 
the importation of pharmaceuticals produced abroad into the U.S. unless the 
original manufacturer has labeled the drug to be marketed in the United States 
(something the manufacturer can easily avoid doing). The statute provides: 
 
 
8.  Id. 
9.  Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1529. 
10. Infra Section II. 
11. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers to 
Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 643–48 (2005) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
12.  21 U.S.C.A. § 381(d)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 116–91). 
13.  Brief for PhRMA as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Impression Prods. Inc., v. Lexmark Int’l, 
Inc., 137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189), 2017 WL 894890. 
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[N]o drug that is subject to section 353(b)(1) of this title may be 
imported into the United States for commercial use if such drug is 
manufactured outside the United States, unless the manufacturer 
has authorized the drug to be marketed in the United States and 
has caused the drug to be labeled to be marketed in the United 
States.14 
 
PhRMA argued it needed a private right of action to sue for patent 
infringement to prevent importation despite these laws—suggesting the 
government inadequately enforced them.15 To the contrary, federal enforcement of 
these laws has been vigorous. As Kevin Outterson has observed: 
 
Federal and state officials are currently attacking Internet 
pharmaceutical arbitrage on multiple fronts. The FDA is 
aggressively enforcing against U.S. companies involved in the 
trade. The Customs Department has posted clarifications of the 
personal use exception to discourage importation. Facilitators 
such as the Discount Prescription Center in West Virginia have 
been challenged by state Boards of Pharmacy as engaged in the 
unlicensed practice of pharmacy. The FDA has sued regional 
facilitators such as Rx Depot for assisting in the importation of 
prescription drugs. The FDA and state pharmacy investigators 
have also purchased prescription drugs in undercover 
operations.16 
 
PhRMA contended “[t]o PhRMA’s knowledge, the federal government has 
never brought an action under § 381(d) against a parallel importer that legitimately 
purchased a drug abroad and then sought to resell it in the United States.”17 This 
statement appears false, or at the very least, disingenuous. For example, the 
government sued and successfully enjoined Rx Depot from illegally importing 
pharmaceuticals from Canada.18 Indeed, in the late 1980s the FDA promulgated 
regulations automatically requiring detention and exportation of pharmaceuticals 
re-imported into the United States from foreign countries unless the importers 
 
14.  21 U.S.C.A. § 381(d)(1)(B) (West, Westlaw through Pub.L. 116–91b). 
15.  Brief for PhRMA, Impression Prods. Inc., 137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189). 
16.  Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International 
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 193, 285 (2005) (citing, inter alia, Lolita C. 
Baldor, FDA: Too Costly To Legalize Drug Imports, Law Vegas Sun (Dec. 24, 2003); Gardiner Harris & Monica 
Davey, U.S. Steps Up Effort Against Drug Imports, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2004), at C1; Recent FDA/U.S. Customs 
Import Blitz Exams Continue to Reveal Potentially Dangerous Illegally Imported Drug Shipments, FDA NEWS 
(Jan. 27, 2004); Becker v. W. Va. Board of Pharm., No. 03-C-1237, slip op. at 11–12 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 
2003); United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (granting preliminary injunction 
against Rx Depot)). 
17.  Brief for PhRMA, Impression Prods. Inc., 137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189). 
18.  United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 290 F. Supp.2d 1238, 1239–40, 1244, 1250–51 (N.D. Okla. 2003). 
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could provide documentation establishing authorization from the original 
manufacturer.19 The district court for the Eastern District of New York invalidated 
the regulations for failure to comply with notice and commenting rulemaking 
requirements.20 But, PhRMA’s suggestion that U.S. laws prohibiting parallel 
imports are not enforced is incorrect. 
There is no doubt that despite these prohibitions, pharmaceuticals are illegally 
imported into the U.S. and that this can raise valid health and safety concerns.21 
However, as discussed below, unlawful importation has not resulted in the inability 
of the pharmaceutical industry to engage in price discrimination, even in the 
context of an international patent exhaustion regime. 
II. THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN BY THE BRANDED
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IS NOT SOCIALLY OPTIMAL BECAUSE IT IS NOT
BASED ON ABILITY TO PAY 
In the abstract, geographic price discrimination has support in economic 
theory.22 The ability to charge different prices in different countries according to 
relative price elasticity in each region increases output while maximizing profit.23 
In the pharmaceuticals context, price discrimination could increase the utilization 
of medicines, particularly in the least-developed nations, thereby improving health 
outcomes.24 The increased profits for pharmaceutical companies could encourage 
more research and development and result in the development of more drugs.25 
But, like most abstract economic theories, this one is based on the false 
premise of rational, frictionless markets and people who are more akin to 
dispassionate Vulcans than short-sighted, grasping, flawed human beings. Once 
the premise is exposed as a fiction, the entire edifice crumbles.26 Sarah Rajec points 
19. See Bellano Int’l Ltd. v. FDA, 678 F. Supp. 410, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
20. Id. at 416.
21. See Imported Drugs Raise Safety Concerns, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143561.htm (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
22. See Patricia M. Danzon, Differential Pricing of Pharmaceuticals: Theory, Evidence and Emerging
Issues, PHARMACOECONOMICS 2 (July 30, 2018), available at https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Danzon-2018-PharmacoEconomics-1.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
23. Danzon, supra note 22 at 2 (“Under normal conditions, such price discrimination increases utilisation
by price-sensitive consumers and, in aggregate, increases consumer welfare and producer profits, relative to 
charging all customers the same price.”); Frank R. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Price Discrimination and Social 
Welfare, 5 CAPITALISM AND SOCIETY 1, Article 2 at 24 (“[P]rice discrimination can increase output and raise 
social welfare.”); Christine Ongchin, Note, Price Discrimination in the Textbook Market: An Analysis of the Post-
Quality King Proposals to Prevent and Disincentivize Reimportation and Arbitrage, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 223, 234 (2007) (“Third-degree price discrimination is economically favorable because it allows 
textbook publishers to sell textbooks in foreign markets. . .. Because of the increase in total output, average costs 
are lowered, allowing for a reduction of prices in the United States.”). 
24. Lichtenberg, supra note 23, at 25–26.
25. Id. at 23.
26. See e.g., Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties Be Able to
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out that geographic price discrimination “may not be the most desirable form of 
price discrimination for consumers, however, because it is imprecise in identifying 
differing demand curves.”27 For example, geographic price discrimination might 
not be sensitive to wealth disparities within countries, resulting in less drug access 
and utilization by lower income individuals. Indeed, this is the pharmaceutical 
industry’s current situation: targeting the highest income individuals in the least-
developed countries for their branded pharmaceuticals. Peter Yu writes: 
 
[B]ecause wealth is usually distributed very unevenly in many less 
developed countries—South Africa being the most cited 
example—some pharmaceutical companies choose to sell their 
products at high prices that are affordable by the more affluent 
minority, even if it means that the product will become 
unaffordable to the larger and poorer majority.28 
 
But even geographic price discrimination adherents agree it is a socially 
optimal practice only to the extent that prices are set in relation to some measure 
of willingness to pay.29 Prices should differ in various countries based on average 
per capita GDP or income, for example.30 To the extent price discrimination is not 
tied to price sensitivity in each country, it results in output losses and inequities 
between nations with respect to the availability of medicines at all levels of society. 
The problem with the pharmaceutical industry is that its price discrimination 
practices do not adhere to these principles. Pharmaceutical companies engage in 
geographic price discrimination and continue to do so even after the Impression 
Products ruling, but the prices set are not tied to willingness to pay. 
The most striking example of this is the high price of pharmaceuticals in the 
United States as compared to countries with comparable average per capita GDP 
and incomes. Studies measuring drug prices in different countries differ to some 
degree in their results due to methodological differences and problems with 
obtaining accurate drug prices.31 Studies vary with respect to the sample of drugs 
researchers select for study and variables, such as whether to weigh the drugs in 
the sample by the quantity dispensed.32 The accurate determination of drug prices 
is hindered by companies varying from their list prices, offering discounts to 
 
Contract Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 445, 469–71 & 
notes 173–78 (2014). 
27.  Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Free Trade in Patented Goods: International Exhaustion for Patents, 29 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317, 321 (2014). 
28.  Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 844–45 (2007) (citing, inter 
alia, Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L 
L.J. 563, 566 (2002)). 
29.  Danzon, supra note 22 at 2–4. 
30.  Id. at 2–3. 
31.  See generally Judith Wagner & Elizabeth McCarthy, International Differences in Drug Prices, 25 
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 475, 478 (2004). 
32.  Id. at 480–81. 
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various distributors, and keeping these price variances as trade secrets.33 Moreover, 
private insurers do not make public the effective prices paid by ultimate purchasers 
of drugs, and Medicaid does not make public the rebates it obtains from 
manufacturers.34 
As a result of these difficulties and methodological differences, the studies 
vary in their exact determinations of the relative price of pharmaceuticals in the 
U.S. compared to other countries. Nonetheless, all the studies agree 
pharmaceutical prices are far higher in the U.S. than in Europe or Canada. The 
studies show drug prices in United States are approximately 32-41% higher than 
in Canada.35 Drug prices are between 51%–60% higher in the U.S. than they are 
in the United Kingdom.36 By comparable magnitudes, drugs prices in the U.S. are 
also far higher than drug prices in Switzerland, Germany, France, Australia, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.37 By any measure, drug prices in the U.S. are 
astronomically high and rising like a rocket ship.38 Robin Feldman reports that 
between 2006 and 2014 drug prices in Medicare D rose by an average of 57% 
cumulatively; that a 2016 industry report projected that drug prices would rise 
11.6% in 2017 for young Americans and 9.9% for adults over 65 with wages only 
rising by 2.5%; and that between 2000 and 2008, the prices of 416 branded drugs 
increased by a range of 100%–499%.39 
This price discrimination against the U.S. is not the type of price 
discrimination that economists applaud as a social good because it is in no way 
tied to the relative wealth or ability to pay of these various countries. In 2017, the 
estimated gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita of the U.S. was $59,500.40 
Norway and Switzerland had far higher per capita GDP than the U.S.: $71,800 and 
$61,400, respectively.41 The other countries had per capita GDP comparable with 
the U.S.: The Netherlands, $53,600; Sweden, $51,500; Germany, $50,400; 
Australia, $50,300; Canada, $48,300; U.K., $44,100; and France, $43,800.42 The 
story is the same with respect to gross national income (“GNI”) per capita. The 
 
33.  Id. at 478-80. 
34.  Id. at 480. 
35.  Id. at 483; Dana O. Sarnak et al., Paying for Prescription Drugs Around the World: Why is the U.S. an 
Outlier?, ISSUE BRIEF, Oct. 2017, Ex. 2, available at https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-
briefs/2017/oct/paying-prescription-drugs-around-world-why-us-outlier (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review); Danzon, supra note 22 at Fig. 2. 
36.  Wagner & McCarthy, supra note 31, at 483; Sarnak et al., supra note 35. 
37.  Sarnak et al., supra note 35. 
38.  See FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 7–8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019). 
39.  Id. at 7–8. 
40.  The World Factbook: Country Comparison: GDP Per Capita, CENT. INTELL. AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
482 
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U.S. GNI per capita at the time of this writing was $60,200.43 Switzerland and 
Norway were higher, with $69,920 and $66,390, respectively.44 The other nations 
on the list are slightly lower but comparable to the U.S.: The Netherlands, $57,380; 
Germany, $55,800; Sweden, $53,990; Australia, $49,930; Canada, $47,280; 
France, $46,900; and the U.K., $45,660.45 
Hence, the price discrimination that the pharmaceutical industry engages in 
with respect to the United States is not socially useful under the theories of the 
most committed price discrimination adherents because it is not based on 
willingness to pay. The setting of prices in the U.S versus these other countries is 
not due to price sensitivity or price elasticity. The true reason for unreasonably 
high drugs prices in the U.S. is a corrupt system of kickbacks, middlemen, perverse 
incentives, and anticompetitive collusion discussed immediately below. 
III. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY’S CORRUPT PRICING SYSTEM
Robin Feldman’s groundbreaking new book, Drugs, Money, and Secret 
Handshakes, provides an elegant and accessible analysis of why drug prices in the 
U.S. are so high.46 Feldman describes “the highly secretive and highly concentrated 
industry known as ‘pharmacy benefit managers’ (PBMs)” who collaborate with 
the branded drug companies to raise prices and create economic pressure and 
perverse incentives for other health care system actors to also facilitate price 
increases.47 Only a brief summary of Feldman’s observations is possible here. I 
urge readers to refer directly to Feldman’s book for the complete analysis, sources, 
and details. That said, following is a brief summary, with any mistakes my own: 
PBMs ostensibly work for their clients, insurance companies and other payers, 
to negotiate lower drug prices with the pharmaceutical companies.48 
Accordingly, insurers pay PBMs based on the discounts from list prices they 
extract from the drug companies.49 
Then, the PBMs write the formularies for insurance companies containing the 
pharmaceuticals that will be covered by the insurance plans.50 
In practice, however, the PBMs agree to secret deals with the drug companies 
to artificially raise drug prices and then grant rebates. On the surface, it appears 
the PBM has extracted a large rebate paid for by the insurance company. In fact, 
43. GNI Per Capita, PPP (Current International $), THE WORLD BANK (2019),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD?year_high_desc=true (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 7–8.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Id. at 13.
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however, because of this gimmick, the rebated price of the drug remains high.51 
Moreover, the deals between the PBMs and the drug makers are kept as trade 
secrets, even from the insurance companies. Hence, the insurance companies do 
not know the actual level of a particular rebate. The PBMs can thereby often keep 
part, or all, of the rebates they extract.52 
In exchange, the PBMs agree they will list their particular branded drugs in the 
formularies to exclude competition that would otherwise potentially lower prices.53 
Moreover, drug companies induce PBMs with other kickback payments they 
disguise with euphemisms such as “administrative fees or data managing fees.”54 
Moreover, the PBM industry is concentrated, with only three PBMs— Express 
Scripts, CVS Health, and OptumRX—having 85% of the market share.55 This 
means the insurance companies have little choice but to deal through these large 
corporate middlemen if they want to negotiate with the drug companies. The PBMs 
discourage the insurance companies from demanding transparency or that more of 
the rebate be passed through to the insurance company by charging more to 
insurance companies that demand such concessions.56 Any insurance company 
bravely insisting on a better deal with the PBMs and lower drug prices would 
experience high short-term losses, resulting in insurance company shareholders 
revolting and demanding new management.57 
U.S. pharmacists are practically prevented from addressing this problem as 
well. Although the FDA allows pharmacists to substitute a generic drug for a 
branded drug in a prescription, pharmacists may only do so if it is the precise FDA-
approved generic for the branded drug; but drug companies circumvent this 
problem by patenting obvious variations of their products once the patents expire.58 
Moreover, some PBMs, such as CVS Health, have acquired massive corporate 
pharmacies, and can therefore instruct their pharmacist employees not to substitute 
the generic.59 And then, the PBM writes a formulary that “give[s] preference to its 
own retail pharmacy, restricting patients’ access to drugs and preventing 
independent drugstores from competing for new customers.”60 The PBMs pay 
kickbacks to large, independent pharmacies in exchange for dispensing the 
branded drugs they prefer—motivated by the kickbacks they themselves receive 
from the branded drug companies.61 
The PBMs then offer kickbacks, artificial rebates, and other incentives to 
51. Id. at 19.
52. FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 13–14, 19.
53. Id. at 20.
54. Id. at 19.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Id. at 35.
57. Id.
58. FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 44–45, 61–62.
59. Id. at 46–47.
60. Id. at 47.
61. Id. at 45.
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doctors and hospitals to induce them to prescribe particular branded drugs.62 These 
are layered on top of pressure from sales representatives, who wine and dine 
doctors, and marketing campaigns directed at doctors and patients.63 
Next, drug companies provide coupons to patients to induce them to prefer 
their drugs. The drug companies then fund “patient advocacy groups” to lobby for 
policies that favor branded drug companies.64 
Finally, all of this is compounded by the drug companies’ gaming the patent 
system to extend their monopolies well beyond the 20-year term of a patent. 
Through the practice of “evergreening,” when a patent is about to expire, the drug 
company patents a new drug that is very often nothing more than a reformulation, 
combination of known medicines, alternative delivery system, or other 
modification that should be invalid for obviousness under the law but is granted a 
patent anyway.65 If generic companies challenge such patents in court, the branded 
drug companies often attempt a reverse settlement, paying the generic company 
money to stay off the market and drop the challenge to the patent.66 
Again, this is merely a high-level summary of the major examples comprising 
the web of collusion and perverse incentives allowing drug prices in the U.S. to 
soar unchecked. 
IV. A SINGLE SOLUTION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY’S CORRUPT PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION SYSTEM? 
What can be done to lower the prices of pharmaceuticals in the U.S. relative 
to Europe and Canada? Unfortunately, many of the proposals that are currently 
being floated would do little to make a dent in the labyrinth of corruption described 
above. 
For example, one solution Democrats in Congress proposed would be allowing 
the federal government to negotiate directly with drug companies for lower prices 
of drugs in Medicare, the government healthcare plan for senior citizens.67 This 
would be a desirable reform to reverse a bizarre policy whereby the government is 
statutorily prohibited from interfering with price negotiations between drug 
manufacturers and the private healthcare plans that administer the Medicare 
prescription drug benefit.68 Also, the reform would ideally also eliminate the law 
providing that the government “may not require a particular formulary or institute 
a price structure for the reimbursement of covered [Medicare] part D drugs.”69 
 
62.  Id. at 50–51. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. at 55. 
65.  FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 60–85. 
66.  Id.  
67.  See Katie Thomas, Assessing Plans to Trim Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2019, at B1. 
68.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-111(i) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91). 
69.  Id. 
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However, only about 43 million people receive drug coverage through Medicare,70 
and presumably the drug companies would jack up prices for the remaining 284 
million Americans to make up for any lost profits resulting from this plan. 
Moreover, the current plans in Congress would only allow negotiations for 250 
drugs.71 Other initiatives that only target Medicare recipients, such as lowering or 
capping out-of-pocket expenses for beneficiaries,72 while desirable, also fail to 
provide a comprehensive solution, and drug companies could offset these benefits 
by raising prices for other payers. 
Another option would be to outlaw the reverse payment settlements branded 
drug companies pay to generic companies to settle lawsuits and delay the entry of 
generic drugs onto the market. Additionally, Congress could strengthen the 
validity requirements for follow-on drug patents to more easily deny such patents 
for obviousness because they introduce no true innovation other than extending the 
drug maker’s monopoly. While this, too, would be desirable to address the 
“evergreening” issue, it would only address one aspect of the myriad of corrupt 
practices discussed above.73 Specifically, branded drug companies would still have 
twenty years of patent monopoly for the original drug and would still have recourse 
to the non-patent related devices for raising prices; they would just be constrained 
in extending their patent monopolies beyond those twenty years. 
Another option would be to reform PBM practices or make them unlawful 
altogether, something Feldman refers to as “slaying the dragon.”74 Certainly, this 
would be highly desirable. But Feldman is skeptical of this as a silver bullet 
solution because if the insurance companies were to negotiate directly with the 
drug makers rather than through a corporate middleman, the drug companies could 
simply use many of the same tactics directly with the insurance companies to block 
low-priced competition that they currently use with PBMs.75 Consider the 
following: 
 
A company with a drug coming off patent would still have the 
volume position that would allow it to offer attractive inducements 
to insurance plans—inducements that the new, lower-priced 
entrant could not beat. Companies with a stable of drugs—some 
with stronger protection, some with weaker protection—could 
 
70.  Juliette Cubanski, Anthony Damico, &and Tricia Neuman, Medicare Part D in 2018: The Latest on 
Enrollment, Premiums, and Cost Sharing, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 17, 2018), 
https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicare-part-d-in-2018-the-latest-on-enrollment-premiums-and-cost-
sharing/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
71.  Thomas, supra note 67; see also FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 60–85 (demonstrating skepticism of this 
as an overall solution on the basis that “Medicare is an enormously complex program, which breeds numerous 
opportunities for manipulation” and “the pharmaceutical industry has proven quite adept at outflanking the federal 
government in the face of complex legislative and regulatory scheme). 
72.  Thomas, supra note 67. 
73.  See supra Section III. 
74.  FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 93–95. 
75.  Id. at 93. 
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bargain across all of those drugs, once again sharing some of the 
monopoly rents from one drug to strangle nascent 
competition. . . . The fact that health insurance executives need to 
meet financial expectations could enhance a drug company’s 
ability to offer enticements. The short-term allure of persuasion 
payments could tempt insurers far more than the uncertain long-
term benefits of competition.76 
 
Increasing transparency is another potential solution. The current presidential 
administration enacted a regulation requiring drug companies to post the list prices 
of drugs in their commercials.77 However, on July 8, 2019, after Merck, Eli Lilly, 
and Amgen sued on the basis that the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) purportedly lacks statutory authority to enact the rule, a federal district 
judge invalidated the rule.78 Given how little attention the public pays to the 
voluminous small print appearing in the margins of pharmaceutical commercials, 
such a modest and symbolic proposal would have done little to reduce the price of 
drugs or even provide meaningful transparency. That the drug companies filed a 
federal lawsuit to block such an inconsequential rule indicates how embarrassed 
they are by their own price gouging. 
One hopes that more ambitious transparency measures than this could be 
effectively pursued. Feldman proposes various direct and indirect measures the 
states or federal government could take to force PBMs and drug companies to 
reveal the details of their secret agreements to raise drug prices and establish 
anticompetitive formularies.79 Shedding light on the shameful details of these 
contracts is undeniably a crucial reform. However, would it really solve the overall 
problem? Elsewhere in her book, Feldman opines that providing insurance 
companies the data files on all claims and rebate checks might be an empty gesture 
because of the vast and complicated nature of the data: 
 
[O]ne cannot overestimate the data analysis challenges and the 
enormous time and resources necessary for health insurers to fully 
interpret what is happening—even on their own side of the 
equation. A full, claims, data transfer can be akin to giving people 
the alphabet and assuring them that they can write Shakespeare. 
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77.  Regulation to Require Drug Pricing Transparency in Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 47 C.F.R. § 
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78.  Merck & Co., Inc. v. US Dept of Health & Human Servs., 385 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  
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If sophisticated insurance companies could not process this information, what 
are the hapless U.S. Congress and the public to do with a dump of information on 
the drug companies’ secret rebates and kickbacks to the PBMs? Even if the details 
of this corruption would spur Congress into action, it would only raise a further 
question: What action could be taken to control drug prices that would be 
effective? 
To answer that question requires probing into the roots of the problem. The 
most likely explanation for the fact that the U.S. pays astronomically higher prices 
for drugs than European countries and Canada is that these countries employ health 
care systems whereby there is only a single payer for health care, the government; 
or a two-tiered system, with the government paying for basic health care and 
premium care available for those who pay for it.81 Because the government is at 
least purchasing basic healthcare, these countries enjoy the power of a monopsony 
to demand lower prices.82 In effect, the single payer can tell the drug companies, 
“lower your price or don’t sell your drug in this country.” U.S. purchasers of health 
care, however, have no such monopsony power, which allows for all the corrupt 
monkey hijinks described above whereby drug companies can raise prices to no 
perceivable limit. As a result, the U.S. bears a far heavier per capita load in 
subsidizing the research and development of pharmaceuticals than any other 
country. 
Should the U.S. adopt a single payer or two-tiered health care system? 
Although this may be the ideal solution, one must immediately acknowledge that 
it is currently unlikely to happen in this country. Even in 2010, when the 
Democratic Party held supermajorities in both houses of Congress as well as the 
presidency, there was insufficient political will to adopt even a public insurance 
option in the insurance exchanges established by the Affordable Care Act.83 Hence, 
even in the best of political circumstances, we have not yet reached the point where 
the U.S. would likely adopt a wholly government-funded health care system. 
Accordingly, before considering that option, it is worth considering one final 
alternative approach: an approach more in line with this country’s free market 
philosophy. The answer to lowering pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. may lie in 
allowing parallel imports from Canada and/or Europe.84 A recent report from the 
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82.  See Wagner & McCarthy, supra note 31, at 486–88. 
83.  Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, HEALTH AFF. (June 
2010), available at https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0363 (on file with The University 
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84.  Brief for PhRMA, Impression Prods. Inc.,137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189). I would not propose 
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Congressional Budget Office estimated that allowing for the importation of 
prescription drugs from Canada would save between $1 billion and $1.5 billion per 
year in government spending on pharmaceuticals.85 Theoretically, the 
pharmaceutical companies would not be able to offset these losses by raising prices 
in Canada or Europe because of the price control mechanisms and monopsony 
conditions in those countries. 
The E.U. provides one example of the parallel importation of pharmaceuticals. 
The E.U. employs a system of regional patent exhaustion, that allows companies 
and individuals to export products, including pharmaceuticals, from one country 
to another within the E.U. without permission of the patent holder.86 Some studies 
have found that this has led to a substantial decrease in prices of pharmaceuticals 
in the importing countries.87 Pavel Kanavos and his colleagues analyzed four 
studies on the effects of parallel importation on pharmaceutical prices in importing 
countries in Europe. Two of the studies found substantial decreases in prices, 
including decreased prices of 12%–19% in Sweden.88 Two other studies attributed 
lower prices to other factors, such as the entry into the market of generic 
competition.89 This would suggest it would be useful to combine parallel 
importation with heightened validity requirements for follow-on pharmaceutical 
patents and the outlawing of reverse settlement payments. Patricia M. Danzon has 
observed that “[i]n the European Union (EU), traditional price differentials 
between countries are being undermined by parallel trade and regulation based on 
foreign prices. This break down of market segmentation leads manufacturers to 
adopt uniform prices EU-wide.”90 
Presumably, a similar effect would occur to at least some degree if the U.S. 
allowed for parallel imports of pharmaceuticals from Canada and/or Europe. The 
passage of legislation allowing for such importation would not be as politically 
difficult as one might assume. In fact, the U.S. already passed such legislation in 
2000, although it was never implemented and has since expired. Pursuant to the 
Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000, the HHS could have promulgated 
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regulations for the importation of pharmaceuticals from Canada if the Secretary 
simply made the certification that doing so would “(A) pose no additional risk to 
the public’s health and safety; and (B) result in a significant reduction in the cost 
of covered products to the American consumer.”91 No Secretary ever opted to take 
that measure, and in 2001, Tommy Thompson—the HHS Secretary under 
President George W. Bush—made the contrary certification, stating to Congress 
that “[a]fter a thorough review of the law, FDA has concluded that it would be 
impossible to ensure that the MEDS Act would result in no loss of protection for 
the drugs supplied to the American people.”92 Secretary Thompson continued, 
“[T]he MEDS Act will pose a greater public health risk than we face today and a 
loss of confidence by Americans in the safety of our drug supply.”93 
Secretary Thompson’s statements are manifestly false. With respect to the 
parallel importation of drugs within the European Union, Kanavos concludes: 
 
[w]hile there have been problems that have emerged associated 
with packaging, labeling, product inserts and potential violation 
of trademark rules, there is no evidence as to whether these 
problems have had an adverse impact on health care. Nor is there 
any evidence that these problems have raised substantial concerns 
among consumers, health care providers, or government 
officials.94 
 
And far from it being “impossible” to ensure that drugs imported from Canada 
or Europe are safe for the American people, Kanavos writes: 
 
[s]uch issues are not beyond the scope of legislation. For example, 
safety provisions could include requirements that importers and 
exporters be registered with the federal government and that the 
government have the right to inspect facilities and places of 
business, verify chains of custody of the products, and determine 
compliance with regulations.95 
 
A cynical observer might be tempted to believe that Secretary Thompson’s 
conclusion was founded, not in a concern for the safety of pharmaceuticals in this 
country, but by a concern for the profits of the powerful U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry. In any event, the certification to allow for importation was never made 
 
91.  21 U.S.C.A. § 384(l)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91). 
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and it appears that Secretary Thompson’s contrary certification has rendered the 
legislation null and void, because it provides: 
If, after the date that is 1 year after the effective date of the regulations under 
subsection (b) and before the date that is 18 months after the effective date, the 
Secretary submits to Congress a certification that, in the opinion of the Secretary, 
based on substantial evidence obtained after the effective date, the benefits of 
implementation of this section do not outweigh any detriment of implementation 
of this section, this section shall cease to be effective as of the date that is 30 days 
after the date on which the Secretary submits the certification.96 
Subsequent bills allowing for the large-scale importation of pharmaceuticals 
died in Congress.97 
Due to the current public outrage at the crippling cost of pharmaceuticals, 
importation provisions may now be politically feasible. Even the current 
Republican administration has floated the idea of allowing for the importation of 
drugs from Canada, although it appears to be a weak, token proposal.98 Rather than 
authorizing and implementing a national system of drug importation for all 
medicines, the proposal would merely allow the states to implement 
“demonstration projects” that are “time limited and require reporting and renewal” 
around the importation of some of the less expensive drugs.99 In particular, the plan 
would exclude importation of almost all drugs that are not taken in pill form and 
most high-priced drugs. This is because the proposal would exclude the 
importation of “biological products [any drug manufactured in or extracted from a 
biological source], infused drugs [drugs administered into the veins through 
infusion], intravenously injected drugs [drugs administered into the veins through 
injection], drugs inhaled during surgery, and certain parenteral drugs [drugs 
administered into the body other than via the mouth or the alimentary canal].”100 
Moreover, “the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] would have broad 
discretion to terminate a demonstration project if the continuation could pose 
additional risk to public health and safety.”101 In other words, another conclusory 
letter like the one Secretary Thompson sent to Congress in 2001 stating that a 
particular “demonstration project” posed a risk to health and safety would end that 
program. Indeed, not twelve months before introducing the proposal, Alex M. Azar 
II, the current HHS Secretary, called the notion of allowing for importation of 
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drugs a “gimmick.”102 To the contrary, his current proposal is a gimmick. As 
Elizabeth Rowley, the director of the diabetes advocacy group T1International 
concluded, “[t]his is kind of a distraction from the real issue, and the real problem 
. . . which is pharmaceutical companies are setting costs at exorbitant rates and 
patients are suffering and dying.”103 
What about a true program for the importation of pharmaceuticals from 
Canada and Europe, implemented nationally, applying to all FDA-approved drugs, 
and enshrined in a statute that cannot be terminated by a letter from the HHS 
Secretary? Would flooding the market with fair-priced competition lower the cost 
of drugs in the U.S.? When I presented this paper at the McGeorge School of Law, 
various experts in attendance expressed doubt. This is because the branded 
pharmaceutical companies would react to such a reform by limiting the supply of 
drugs to the countries of exportation, such that there would be insufficient drugs 
to import into the United States. Countries in Europe and Canada would then 
rationally bar the export of pharmaceuticals from their countries, in order to 
safeguard a sufficient supply for their own citizens. Indeed, Canadian citizens and 
the Canadian government reacted with hostility even in response to the current 
U.S. administration’s toothless proposal for allowing limited “demonstration 
projects” around the importation of the least-expensive pills from Canada. One 
recent article reported the following response from a Canadian professor: “‘You 
are coming as Americans to poach our drug supply, and I don’t have any polite 
words for that,’ said Amir Attaran, a professor at the University of Ottowa, who 
calls the plan ‘deplorable’ and ‘atrociously unethical.’ ‘Our drugs are not for you, 
period.’”104 The president of a Canadian patient advocacy organization said, “[i]t’s 
time for [the importation proposal] to crash and burn. . . . Canadians may die.”105 
In response, Canada’s health minister “pledged to ‘ensure there are no adverse 
effects to the supply or cost of prescription drugs in Canada.’”106 Options on the 
table for Canada would include placing pharmaceuticals on Canada’s export 
control list, passing a law banning the export of pharmaceuticals, or imposing high 
exportation taxes on pharmaceuticals.107 
Would the pharmaceutical companies really cut off their nose to spite their 
face in this manner? Would they really drastically reduce their output of 
pharmaceuticals to Canada and the entire E.U. if the U.S. approved importation 
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from all of those countries? They were not able to do so in response to the 
allowance of parallel imports within the E.U. because the E.U. has restrictions 
“that manufacturers may not explicitly ban exports to other E.U. member states; 
monitor the final destination of products; or make written agreements with 
wholesalers or other direct purchasers to restrict supply.”108 But reducing output 
of pharmaceuticals to all of Europe and to Canada to the extent that it triggers an 
international pharmaceutical trade war would surely not be in the pharmaceutical 
industry’s long-term interest. Indeed, allowing for fair trade of pharmaceuticals 
may increase drug sales overall. While fair trade would reduce the individual price 
of drugs, more drugs would be sold overall because sick Americans could actually 
afford to fill their prescriptions.109 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the U.S. cannot rely on this free market importation solution of riding on the 
coattails of low drug prices single payer and two-tiered countries negotiated, then 
the only solution is to join those countries. The surest way to end the 
pharmaceutical industry’s corrupt price discrimination system is for the U.S. to 
adopt a single-payer system, at least with respect to pharmaceuticals. Although this 
was not politically feasible when Congress passed the Affordable Care Act in 
2010, times change. Members of “Generation Z,” now in their teens, are more 
liberal and believe in government more than preceding generations.110 Should our 
civilization survive the Climate Crisis, perhaps this new generation will implement 
a single payer system. In this way, the U.S. government, under the threat of not 
buying a particular drug at all and wielding the power of a monopsony, could 
demand prices at the level of Europe and Canada for each drug. Such a system 
would remove from the equation the profit-seeking PBMs and other factors that 
create perverse incentives, kill competition, and exert economic pressure to send 
the prices of medicines ever higher. 
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